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Highlights
• The world economy is going through its biggest transformation in a
relatively short space time. There have been many explanations
for this phenomenon but the unprecedented scale and pace of this
change and, most crucially, its implications, still seems little un-
derstood. In turn, there has been little preparation for, or adjust-
ment to, this changing world, though if the change continues at this
pace, the effectiveness of many global institutions in their current
form will be threatened.
• We highlight the dramatic degree of the shifts taking place in world
GDP and trade and include fresh projections of what world trade
patterns might look like in 2020, should the trends observed over
the past decade continue. We also show the resulting shift in trade
relationships for many key countries. European member states
tend to have quite different trading partners’ profiles, and this he-
terogeneity is quite likely to become more pronounced with time.
This, in turn, suggests a significant challenge for the effective func-
tioning of the euro area and weakens the original rationale of its
creation.
• If our projections to 2020 are broadly right, then many established
frameworks for the running of the world economy and its gover-
nance are not going to be fit for purpose, and will need to change.
The global monetary system itself, and global organisations such
as the IMF, G7 and G20 will have to adapt considerably if they want
to remain legitimate representatives of the world order. The alter-
native is their relegation to irrelevance. 
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1. Introduction
There has been an eastwards shift in global economic power, but it was only at the start of the last  
decade that its scale and unprecedented nature began to be grasped in Europe and the United States. 
The term ‘BRIC’ to refer to the emerging economic powers of Brazil, Russia, India and China was coined  
in 2001 (O’Neill, 2001). The exact composition of the group of countries that will emerge as the new  
global powers during the twenty-first  century is not yet clear, but it  is now more accepted that the  
economic and political relevance of the West is in the process of being rescaled.
Some authors, mostly economic historians, refute that these changes are sustainable and make the  
point that the West has seen its economic dominance threatened before: by the post-war rise of the  
Communist bloc, by the 1970s oil shock and subsequent stagflation, by the stellar ascent of Japan. In  
each of these cases, the inexorable decline of Europe and the US was predicted, but, at least so far, did  
not materialise. In the minds of some, the rise of the BRICs and other large emerging economies might  
turn out similarly and we could yet see another resurgence of the West (Rosecrance, 2013).
We strongly disagree with this. Table 1 shows that the scale of the change in the pattern of global GDP 
observed in the last ten years is unprecedented since such economic data has existed. In the early  
1960s, Europe and the United States commanded together roughly 67 percent of world GDP and Japan 
represented a further 10 percent. As Table 1 shows, over the next three decades to 1990, while the  
relative size of Europe, the US and Japan changed between them (the latter continuing to rise), their  
combined share of world GDP remained dominant. As recently as 1994 China still only accounted for  
less than three percent of the global economy.
Table 1: Change in share of world GDP, percentage points
1961-
1970
1971-
1980
1981-
1990
1991-
2000
2001-
2010
1961-
2012
China -0.42 -1.36 -0.09 2.06 5.25 8.04
European Union 0.65 4.76 3.51 -6.59 -1.21 -5.37
Japan 3.39 2.48 3.49 -0.70 -4.28 4.47
United States -3.13 -9.67 -1.28 4.91 -9.12 -16.68
West -2.48 -4.91 2.23 -1.68 -10.33 -22.05
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank.
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Since 2000, however, things have changed dramatically (Figure 1). Japan began to lose ground at the  
same speed at which it gained it in the previous decades; China increased its share of global GDP by an  
unprecedented 5.25 percentage points. The West's share shrunk by 10.33 percentage points: more 
than the combined loss of the previous 40 years.
Figure 1: Share of world GDP, 1961-2012
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations.
The rise of China and other emerging nations can be partly attributed to an environment of increasing 
economic interconnectedness between countries. The change in the pattern of economic growth at a  
global level has thus been accompanied by an unprecedented shift in trade patterns. Similar to world  
GDP shares, the pace of change in the last decade has been remarkable. BRIC economies accounted for  
less than 6 percent of world trade1 in the early 1990s, while the US and EU combined commanded 
almost 60 percent (Figure 2). While the picture was not too different in the early 2000s, by 2011 the  
BRICs had more than tripled their share, while the EU alone lost more than 10 percentage points of its  
world trade share.
1 Trade is defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services.
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Figure 2: Share of world trade, %
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations.
Although providing a clear picture of the increasing relevance of the BRICs, the aggregates in Figure 2  
disguise how most of the change witnessed during the last decade has been down to one country:  
China. With an average yearly growth rate in trade of 23.2 percent from 2002-11, China has surpassed  
the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany in terms of its global trade share. Over the last decade, China  
increased its  world  trade share  by 5.40  percentage  points,  while  the OECD countries together  lost  
almost 12 percentage points. Over the period for which data is available, such large increases were 
only witnessed in the 1980s, when the combined EU world trade share soared by 5.27 percentage 
points, mostly because of the strong export performances of Germany, Italy and Spain. However, such  
a large decline in the share of developed countries is unprecedented (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Share of world trade, %
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations.
Trading patterns are also changing significantly within the EU, which is marked by significant internal 
heterogeneity (Figure 4). For example, whereas Germany's share has remained practically unaltered 
for the last 20 years (although marked by a high degree of volatility), France's share has shrunk by  
almost  2 percentage points.  Spain,  however,  was on a more or  less steady upward trend until  the  
financial crisis. Similarly, the range of trade partners of European countries has diversified and evolved  
along different paths, as we will analyse in section 3.
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Figure 4: Share of world trade of the top five euro-area economies, %
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations.
Our contention is that these major changes in trade patterns will not only have a significant effect on 
individual countries’  long-term growth prospects,  but will  also affect  the balance of power in global  
governance,  the  role  of  different  currencies  on  the  world  stage  and  the  functioning  of  European  
economic and monetary union (EMU).
In section 2, we analyse the likelihood that the current trends continue for the next decade, and we will  
forecast trade patterns up to 2020. Section 3 looks at the implications at the global level and at the  
European level, and section 4 provides some concluding remarks.
2. The world in 2020
2.1 Assessing the fundamentals of the transition
Before trying to imagine what the (trade) future will  look like at  the end of this decade, it  is  worth 
pausing  to  reflect  on  whether  the  fundamentals  of  the  change  in  GDP  and  trade  patterns  are 
sustainable, or whether there is a likelihood of a reversal of current trends. We believe that there is a  
secular transition of economic power from advanced economies to new emerging market nations, and 
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this trend is unlikely to reverse. There is an alternative view that much of this trade shift is linked to the  
unsustainable rise of China’s exports and other emerging nations’ – possibly associated – commodity  
exports. We doubt this alternative view.
Given its disproportionate weight among the BRICs and in a global perspective, deciphering China’s  
economic trend is fundamental. The established consensus is that at the origin of China’s stellar growth 
rates was a combination of cheap and abundant labour, favourable terms for foreign companies willing  
to invest in the country, and the adoption of a mixed capitalist system. This could only be a temporary 
business  model.  Sustaining  rapid  growth  rates  based  on  exports  (and  separately  state-directed 
investment), which depend on low wage advantage, were widely agreed to be not sustainable. Today,  
China is trying to deal with the adjustment challenges, and at the core of these, wages have started to 
increase rapidly, which while necessary to help shift the driver of growth to personal consumption,  
undermines export growth. While this adjustment – along with other forces – will contribute to a slower  
rate  of  overall  growth,  we think that  the country is  proving itself  able  to  manage  successfully  the  
transition  to  a  higher  level  of  the  value  chain.  Through  heavy  investment  in  infrastructure,  higher  
education and R&D, China is in the process of improving its non-price competitiveness and is setting 
the foundation for sustained growth in the years to come. Much of this ‘new’ China is discussed in some  
detail in The BRIC Road to Growth (O'Neill, 2013). China’s ongoing changes are reflected, among other 
things, in the rising Global Competitiveness Index score assigned to the country by the World Economic 
Forum in its yearly competitiveness report (Table 2).
Table 2: China’s ranking in the WEF Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) and its sub-components
China 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
GCI 34 34 30 29 27 26 29 29
Institutions 75 77 56 48 49 48 50 47
Infrastructure 52 52 47 46 50 44 48 48
Macroeconomic environment 3 7 11 8 4 10 11 10
Health and primary education 85 61 50 45 37 32 35 40
Higher education and training 74 78 64 61 60 58 62 70
Goods market efficiency 60 58 51 42 43 45 59 61
Labor market efficiency 54 55 51 32 38 36 41 34
Financial market development 119 118 109 81 57 48 54 54
Technological readiness 69 73 77 79 78 77 88 85
Market size 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Business sophistication 58 57 43 38 41 37 45 45
Innovation 38 38 28 26 26 29 33 32
Source: WEF.
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From the macroeconomic point of view, the challenge will be for China to re-orient its growth from an  
investment-based  model  to  a  more  consumption-based  economy.  The  country’s  gross  capital  
formation is currently hovering at around 50 percent of GDP. This is likely to prove unsustainable in the 
medium-run. The Chinese authorities are fully aware of the problem and we are confident they will take  
the necessary steps in the coming years to curb investment and boost consumption. This important 
shift across GDP components is likely to have a relevant impact on trade. An increase in consumption in 
the second largest market in the world (after the US) will be associated with a significant pick-up in  
imports.
Figure 5: China’s imports as a percentage of world imports (top panel) and of GDP (bottom panel)
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Source: World Bank.
At the same time, foreign firms that  originally  delocalised their  manufacturing to China to reap the  
benefits of low labour costs might re-locate elsewhere, thus reducing export growth. This probably will  
contribute to a different pattern of world trade with Chinese exports probably rising at a slower rate and  
imports probably rising at a faster rate. As a result, China's net trade and current account surplus is set  
to decline, as it indeed already has been doing (Figure 6). While the global ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of this  
new China will be quite different, it seems likely that their rise in world trade is set to continue.
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Figure 6: China’s current account, % of GDP
Source: IMF WEO October 2013.
There is a view that China will not be able to adjust to this new model and the weight of the ‘old’ China  
will drag down the overall growth rate to such an extent that, just like previous predictions of new world  
economic powers, China will similarly turn out to be a disappointment. While there will be clear losers  
inside China and some consequences from the adjustment, and although we believe this will lead to  
lower rates of overall economic growth, it will still be growth rates  sufficient to make it probable that  
China will become as large as the US within the next 20 years (assuming 6-7 percent real GDP growth  
rates).
Although the two are marked by different macroeconomic conditions, we expect the US and the EU to 
broadly experience a declining share of world GDP and trade.
While many believe that the US has been able to generate moderate growth rates in the past decade 
only because of an ultra-loose monetary policy and the development of fresh bubbles in the internet  
and housing sectors, there are actually some signs that the post-crash US economy is emerging in a 
different  shape to the pre-crash US.  For  example,  the current  account  balance of  payments deficit  
declined to around 2 percent of GDP by late 2013 compared to a deficit of more than 6 percent before  
2008.  For  Krugman  (2013),  this  indicates  that  the country  might  be  entering a  period  of  “secular  
stagnation,” but as 2014 unfolds, there are some grounds for a less pessimistic stance. If the improving 
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external balance continues, it follows that the US might slow its rate of decline of world trade share (and 
GDP).
Europe, on the other hand, continues to experience sluggish growth rates. Although structural reforms  
have been undertaken in several countries as a result of the euro-area crisis, the latter has also harmed 
the continent’s long-term potential by holding back investment and eroding human capital, partly due 
to the rising structural unemployment rates. Although some cyclical indicators suggest that crisis euro-
area  member  countries  are  showing  signs  of  some  recovery,  and  their  own  exports  appear  to  be  
improving, these are rather tentative and, collectively, European economies continue to struggle. For all  
the signs  of  stabilisation  and recovery in  the likes  of  Ireland and Spain,  and perhaps Greece  and  
Portugal, Italy and France continue to struggle.
We note that the IMF, in its latest macroeconomic projections up to 2018, forecast comparative growth 
paths that closely resemble the ones observed in the past decade. Looking at world shares of GDP, the  
Washington-based organisation expects China to expand by roughly 5 percentage points in the period  
2009-18, just as the country did in the previous decade. The IMF also project similar paths for others,  
for  example  Japan  (roughly  -1  percentage  point)  and  Russia  (flat  share).  In  line  with  the  tone  
expressed earlier, the IMF projects the share loss of the US to slow down (from -3 percentage points to  
-2 percentage points),  which is  however partially  compensated for  by a speeding up of  the fall  of  
Europe (from -3 percentage points to -4 percentage points) (Figure 7).
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Figure 7: GDP in PPP, % of world total
Source: IMF WEO October 2013.
All in all, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the next decade will largely continue down the 
path that the global macroeconomic trends followed in the early 2000s, with perhaps some debate as 
to whether it will be at the same speed.
In this regard, it is worth noting that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), a trade 
agreement currently under negotiation between the EU and the US, is unlikely to interfere significantly  
with the secular trade changes being observed, which are driven by gargantuan changing patterns of  
wealth  creation.  Moreover,  even  were  TTIP  to  be  signed  today,  its  (limited)  impact  would  unlikely  
materialise before 2020, the end-point of the horizon we are currently analysing. As such, we do not  
feel compelled to explore its consequences further.
In the next section, we will offer our own extrapolations for trade patterns up to 2020. Of course, by  
definition,  such  projections  are  merely  a  strong  working  assumption  and  subject  to  considerable  
uncertainty. However, as we will show, such a simple exercise leads to powerful insights regarding the 
13
likely evolution of the balance of power in global governance, the changing role of different currencies 
in the foreign exchange market, and challenges for stability within the euro area.
2.2 Extrapolating trade patterns to 2020 
Following  on  from  Section  2.1,  to  undertake  our  projections,  we  downloaded  data  on  exports  and 
imports  of  goods  and  services  in  current  US  dollars  from  the  World  Bank  Development  Indicators 
database. We then aggregated the data to obtain total trade for 256 countries and country groupings 
from 1960-20122.  After having computed year-on-year growth rates,  we derived the average yearly  
growth  over  the  period  2003-12.  We  then  projected  trade  figures  assuming  yearly  growth  at  this 
constant  decennial  average rate.  By doing so,  we have effectively assumed an exponential  growth 
pattern in nominal trade.
Such an assumption seems however reasonable, judging from both long-term and shorter-term growth 
paths in nominal trade. Table 3 shows the coefficient of determination (R-squared) of both a linear and  
an exponential model, for five countries or country aggregates. Interestingly, in all cases but two (the  
US and the World in the last decade), an exponential trend is a better approximation of the growth path  
followed by nominal trade than a linear one. Even in the cases where a linear model is a better fit to the  
data than the exponential one, we highlight that the difference remains marginal.
Table 3: Goodness of fit (R-squared) of linear and exponential models
R-squared 1960-2012 2003-2012 1960-2012 2003-2012 1960-2012 2003-2012 1960-2012 2003-2012 1960-2012 2003-2012
exp 0.9634 0.7508 0.9687 0.7444 0.9911 0.9517 0.9187 0.7337 0.9747 0.7804
linear 0.8258 0.7459 0.8191 0.7407 0.5805 0.9287 0.8998 0.7282 0.8570 0.7827
euro area EU China Japan U.S.
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations.  Note: Time spans might vary across countries.
2 This dataset turns out to be an unbalanced panel, given data is available with quite different time spans for each country.
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Box 1: Value Added Trade Data
As  extensively  documented  by  joint  work  of  the  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD)  and  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  gross  export  figures  might  prove 
misleading when trying to establish trade links between countries. In so far as value chains stretch  
beyond national borders, country A may be exporting to B intermediate products, which could actually  
be destined to satisfy country C’s domestic demand. Whereas this transaction would be recorded as  
gross exports from A to B, the actual link is with C. 
In  2013,  a  new  Trade  in  Value  Added  (TiVA)  database  was  made  available  by  the  OECD-WTO.  This 
contains value added indicators for  57 countries covering the years 1995,  2000,  2005,  2008,  and  
2009. Although such a database does not cater for an analysis as detailed as the one we conducted on  
the IMF’s DOTS, and it does not capture the effect of the Great Recession on trade links, it nonetheless  
allows us to partially test our previous findings. 
Throughout this box, we will analyse ‘domestic value added embodied in foreign final demand’ which,  
according to the OECD, illustrates the full impact of final demand in foreign markets to domestic output.  
It can most readily be interpreted as 'exports of value-added'.
Table 4 details how, around the time of the introduction of the euro, for all the top EA-6 economies, the  
other countries of the European Union represented more than 50 percent of their final export demand.  
Over less than a decade, however,  this share shrunk for  all  countries and, in the case of Italy  and  
Germany, by 2009 the EU ticked below the 50 percent level. This trend is only likely to have continued,  
if anything at a faster pace, throughout the crisis. 
Table 4: Domestic value added embodied in EU final demand
2000 2009
France 54.3% 50.5%
Italy 51.7% 48.4%
Germany 52.5% 49.1%
Belgium 60.9% 57.0%
Spain 62.7% 59.8%
Netherlands 64.3% 61.1%
Source: OECD/WTO TiVA database.
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Looking at country-specific developments, as we highlight in Section 3, looking at gross export figures, 
China was rapidly gaining importance as a trade partner for France. Value added data corroborates this 
finding,  and  actually  shows how  German final  demand has been sharply  losing  ground  in  the  last  
decade.
Figure 8: Gross exports (top panel) and exports of value added (bottom panel) by trade partner, % of  
total
Source: Bruegel based on OECD/WTO TiVA database, IMF DOTS.
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When looking at Germany, the major finding in section 3, below, was a fading importance of France as a 
trading partner and a soaring share of exports being destined to China. In this respect, value added data 
confirms the trend. While looking at gross export figures China seemed to be a much smaller partner for  
Germany than France in 2009, this gap is significantly reduced when looking at exports of value added.
Figure 9: Gross exports (top panel) and exports of value added (bottom panel) by trade partner, % of  
total
Source: Bruegel based on OECD/WTO TiVA database, IMF DOTS.
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Finally,  we  look  at  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium,  the  countries  which,  due  to  their  economic  and  
geographical characteristics3, are more likely to see their gross exports inflated. Interestingly, two of the 
countries that appeared as most reliant on the EU for their (gross) exports, see this share significantly  
re-dimensioned (by as much as 30 percent of total exports) when looking at the value added of exports. 
Figure 10: Exports of Belgium (top panel) and of the Netherlands (bottom panel) to the EU, % of total
3 Both countries’ industrial production is devoted in large shares at providing intermediate goods to German and French 
firms, respectively. Moreover, both countries experience a strong ‘port effect’, as goods for other continental countries may  
be shipped through Antwerp and Rotterdam.
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Source: Bruegel based on OECD/WTO TiVA database, IMF DOTS.
All in all, our main message is confirmed that trade patterns are shifting and that EU countries, and in 
particular those of the euro area, are trading less and less between themselves while increasing their  
export reliance on other markets. This in turn corroborates our view that, going forward, the trade-related 
benefits of  EMU will  become less evident and that  a  strengthening of  the EMU architecture will  be  
needed to shore up against asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. 
In order to stress-test our results, we also considered alternative techniques to extrapolate future trade  
trends.  These  included  using  different  time-windows  for  computing  the  average  growth  rate  to  be 
applied to future years, specifically estimating an exponential growth model based on (varying) past 
trends and using the fitted values of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) univariate regression model. The  
full results are presented and discussed in Appendix 1. Far from aiming to forecast to the decimal digit  
trade shares in  2020,  the main  purpose of  our  exercise  is  to  give a quantitative  idea of  the large 
changes that have already taken place and what would happen if these trends were to continue over  
the  next  few  years.   Although  at  varying  velocity,  all  the  methods  considered  point  in  the  same 
direction: a change in world trade patterns, main partners, and a (more or less) rapid decline of the  
West.
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Figure 11: Share of world trade, %
Source: Bruegel calculations based on World Bank data.
As can be seen in Figure 11, our baseline projections suggest a continuation of the trends observed in  
the past  decade.  By  2020  the world  will  look substantially  different.  While  currently  the EU  is  the  
largest trading block in the world, controlling a third of world trade, by 2020 this will shrink to less than  
one quarter, with China on its heels. The BRICs, collectively, will represent 31 percent of global trade,  
significantly more than the EU. China itself, excluding the other BRICs, will have a considerably bigger  
share of world trade than the US.
As detailed in Figure 12, even when projecting trade figures assuming just half-trend growth rates in the  
next six years, by 2020 the BRICs will  control more than a fifth of world trade, while the EU will  be  
slightly above a quarter. China alone would represent approximately 16 percent of global trade, almost  
twice the US share.
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Figure 12: Share of world trade in 2020 (forecast assuming half-trend), %
Source: Bruegel calculations based on World Bank data.
As we discussed briefly earlier,  behind the EU aggregate,  there are considerable changes going on  
within  EU  member  countries.  Figure  13  plots  the  world  trade  shares  of  the  top  five  euro-area 
economies.  It  is interesting to note that,  although with largely different initial  trading positions,  our  
extrapolation predicts a sharp fall in trade shares of all the countries under analysis. The speed of the  
fall varies according to the country and depends on the economy’s trading performance in the last 10  
years, compared to the evolution of global trade. According to our projections, Spain will be the 'best'  
performing of the top five euro-area economies, losing merely 0.7 percent of its world trade share by  
2020. This value will range between -0.9 percent and -2.1 percent for the others.
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Figure 13: Share of world trade, %
Source: Bruegel calculations based on World Bank data.
Interestingly,  Germany comes out as the worst top five euro-area performer in terms of trade-share  
loss. This seems to clash with the common wisdom that the country’s exports are burgeoning. In order  
to reconcile the latter finding with our analysis, we broke down German trade in world shares of exports  
and imports. As can be seen in Figure 14 below, whereas Germany has managed to broadly uphold its  
export share since the 1970s, imports have declined significantly by roughly 2 percentage points of  
world imports, itself of some importance to the issue of improved euro-area stability. This element will  
be taken into further consideration when drawing our conclusions for the functioning of the euro area in  
the next section.
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Figure 14: Share of world exports and imports for Germany
Source: Bruegel calculations based on World Bank data.
3.  The consequences for the euro area, global governance and management
3.1 Europe/euro area
In this section, we open the 'euro-area box' to look at what the consequences will be of the major trade  
changes we are witnessing for the individual economies of the common currency bloc. In section 2.2,  
we hinted at the fact that euro-area countries are expected to be affected differently by the 'decline of  
the West'.  Although the speed of relative decline is different, all  countries seem to be on the same  
downward sloping path of declining global trade share. However, that is only part of the story.
Building on the IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database, we explored individual countries’  
bilateral trade links from 1980-2012. By applying a similar methodology to the one detailed in section 
2.2, we projected export patterns up to 2020. The results are especially interesting. European countries 
tend to have quite different trading partners’ profiles, and this heterogeneity is quite likely to become  
more pronounced with time.
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Table  5:  Top  exporting  destinations  in  2012,  2020  (baseline  forecast),  and  2020  (half-trend  
forecast)
2012 2020f
2020f – half 
trend
1 France China France
2 United Kingdom France China
3 Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
1 Germany Germany Germany
2 Belgium China Belgium
3 Italy Belgium China
1 Germany Germany Germany
2 France France France
3 United States Switzerland Switzerland
1 France France France
2 Germany Germany Germany
3 Italy Italy Italy
1 Germany Germany Germany
2 Belgium Belgium Belgium
3 France France France
1 Germany Germany Germany
2 France France France
3 Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands
Germany
France
Italy
Spain
Netherlands
Belgium
Source: Bruegel calculations based on IMF DOTS.
For example, while in 2012 Germany’s top four trading partners were France, the United Kingdom, the  
Netherlands and the US, by 2020 things will look very different, with China probably Germany’s biggest  
export market, followed by France, the Netherlands and Poland. When EMU was created, it was highly  
unlikely that 21 years later, many would have envisaged a world in which China, not France, would be  
Germany’s number one trade partner.
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Figure 15: German export destinations, % of total exports
 
Source: Bruegel calculations based on IMF DOTS.
Interestingly, China is expected to become of major importance as an export destination for France as  
well  as for  Germany. Just  as interestingly,  this is  less the case for  the other five largest  euro-area 
economies. Over the next eight years, China’s weight in the export basket is projected to more than  
double for France and Spain, increase sizably for Germany and the Netherlands, but only marginally for  
Italy and Belgium.
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Figure 16: Exports to China, % of total
Source: Bruegel calculations based on IMF DOTS.
This suggests that China and emerging/developing4 markets as an export destination are likely to be 
very different depending on the country. For example, by 2020 Italy and Germany will export more to 
emerging/developing markets than to euro-area partners, while the contrary will  be true for France,  
Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands.
The forecasted large surge in French exports to China is led by the strong performance of the country’s 
exports in the period 2003-2012, when France more than doubled the share of its China-bound gross  
exports. This strong performance finds confirmation in the TiVA value added dataset of the OECD/WTO  
(see Box 1 for more information). Between 2000 and 2009, the share of French value added embodied  
in Chinese domestic  demand more than doubled (from 1.6 percent to 3.5 percent).  Looking at the  
breakdown by industry,  we notice  that  in  2009  (last  year  for  which  data is  available)  France  was  
exporting value added to China mostly in business services (30.5 percent), machinery and equipment 
(11.9 percent), and transport, storage, and telecommunications (10.8 percent).
4 IMF 2012 definition. For more information on the exact composition, please refer to the IMF October 2012 World Economic  
Outlook.
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Figure 17: Exports to euro area and emerging/developing markets in 2020 (forecast), % of total
  
Source: Bruegel calculations based on IMF DOTS.
Of  course,  the  percentages  of  total  exports  hide  the fact  that  exports  play  a  very different  role  in  
individual countries. For small open economies like Belgium or the Netherlands, exports of goods and  
services represent more than 70 percent of GDP, while they account for  roughly 30 percent of the 
economies of Italy and France. It is also obviously the case that for smaller euro-area economies, their  
trade is more likely to remain dominated by their larger immediate neighbours.
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Figure 18: Exports, % of GDP
Source: World Bank.
Nonetheless the dispersion in the relevance of trade as a share of GDP is increasing, a trend that has 
been ongoing since 1995. Interestingly, the dispersion is higher in the euro-area subset of countries,  
than  in  the  whole  EU  group.  The  gap  between  the  10-year  moving  averages  of  the  two  has been  
widening (see Figure 19). 
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Figure 19: Variance in exports as % of GDP
Source: Bruegel calculations based on World Bank.
All in all, this evidence seems to suggest that not only exports play a different role (even controlling for  
GDP size) among euro-area economies, but that for the larger euro-area economies, exports are going 
to be increasingly diverse beyond the euro area. For Italy, it will be a broader group of the emerging  
economies and not quite so dominated by China whereas for France and Germany, China becomes a 
major trade partner. 
This suggests quite an important challenge for the effective functioning of the euro area. In principle,  
the single most important rationale for a currency union is that participating members conduct most of  
their  trade  with  each  other.  This  obviously  underlined  the  economic  rationale  for  EMU,  especially  
because of the close trade links between the largest economies: France, Germany and Italy. But if it is  
the case that for each of these (which have less of their  overall  economic activity originating from 
international trade than the smaller euro-area economies) more and more of their trade will be with  
countries outside the euro area, the benefits of EMU are less clear cut and decreasing over time.
Moreover, in terms of the Optimal Currency Area criteria outlined by Mundell (1961) and later authors,  
we highlight  the fact  that  increasingly  heterogeneous trade partners,  combined with the mounting 
weight of exports in countries’ GDP, augment the possibility of a heterogeneous macroeconomic shock 
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hitting the euro area. Under this scenario, optimal monetary policy might differ as individual countries 
of the bloc find themselves at different points of the business cycle. The benefits of sharing a common 
currency would then be reduced.
Such a future would be immediately seized on by many eurosceptics as a particularly powerful reason 
why EMU is not going to survive, and it is probably an issue that European – and the domestic euro-
area national – policymakers need to consider more closely than they seemingly do today. But, as we 
will try to elaborate more in the next section, what it certainly means is that if policymakers genuinely  
wish for EMU to survive and indeed, become stronger, they have to ensure that it is more robust and 
adaptable to ongoing challenges, including the likelihood that trade with each other is going to be less  
important than conceived when EMU was created.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the other challenges (such as the appropriate fiscal  
rules and banking union to  name just  two),  however  if  the euro area needs to  be strengthened to 
mitigate against the pressures for less European focus as a result of rising trade shares with non-euro 
area countries, then one way for this to progress would be for the euro area, and perhaps even in some 
cases,  the  EU  to  act  as  one  common  representative  bloc  in  key  global  governance  institutions,  
especially the IMF and, within the G20, a revised G7 (allowing each country to still represent itself in the 
G20 individually). One of the additional benefits of this is that it might, in turn, strengthen the united  
voice and purpose in terms of the problems inside the euro area and the EU also. This is of course, in  
addition to the reality that making space in the IMF and other such forums is necessary to allow China 
and other countries more space, an issue to which we now turn.
3.2 Europe and global governance
If the larger European countries are indeed likely to see their trade patterns shifting to the degree that  
more trade is conducted outside of the euro area than within, on one level this would suggest that  
individual nations would have even more interest in representing themselves in global institutions that  
preside over running the world economy. However, it is undoubtedly the case that other non-euro area  
countries  would see less need  for  such  individual  countries  to  have  the same  size  of  seat  at  the 
relevant tables. It is also arguably the case therefore that if the euro-area countries wish to maintain  
(indeed strengthen) the euro then perhaps it might make sense for them to finally allow their common 
global  representation to be shared as one.  This notion has been aired before (for  example,  O’Neill,  
2011;  O’Neill,  2013;  Bini-Smaghi,  2006;  Ahearne  et al,  2006),  but based on our global  trade share 
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projections, and the patterns of growth facing individual countries, it is going to be increasingly difficult  
for euro-area member countries to maintain their current position.
To take one example, although not suggesting they are especially guilty, but Italy today is already less 
than a quarter the size of China, and not much bigger than any of the other BRIC economies. By 2020,  
China may be six or seven times the size of Italy (Canada another G7 country is smaller than Italy).  
Given that they share a common monetary policy with Germany and France, and their fiscal policy is  
constrained by their EMU obligations, what is really the modern justification for Italy to warrant its own 
seat at the G7 table, at the IMF and so on? Yes, it is one of the larger democratic economies, which 
might give it some vague justification in a lesser and lesser important G7 Group, but in terms of an  
optimal world economy and its governance, this is hardly a reasonable stance. If the G7’s remaining  
virtue is that it is a club of western democracies, then it probably does not have a great – at least in the  
next decade or two – truly global future. And even if it survives and has some useful purpose for those  
democracies, it is much more difficult to regard this as a truly modern globally representative entity.
As O’Neill (2011) and Ahearne et al (2006) have argued, it would be presumably much more effective 
to  have  a  'new'  G7  in  which  the  euro-area  members  would  be  represented  as  one.  This  would  
immediately make space for two other members in an exact G7, of which China would be clearly the  
most obvious choice. There is likely to be an increasingly reasonable argument that the other 'smaller'  
G7  economies,  Canada  and  the  UK,  will  also  have  less  reason  to  be  part  of  a  truly  globally 
representative G7, with other candidates from the emerging world having a greater justification as they  
get bigger. So an ideal G7 as such would probably only really include the US, Japan and the euro area or  
alternatively  the  EU,  from  the  so-called  developed  world,  leaving  plenty  of  space  for  other  rising  
economies in addition to China.
As O’Neill and others have also argued, if such a revamped and more effective G7 could be established,  
it would pave the way for much easier reform of the IMF and World Bank and their voting rights and  
beyond (Leech and Leech, 2005). The inability or lack of desire of European countries to give up their  
voting power and seats lies at the heart of why the IMF struggles to become more representative of the  
world we have moved into. However, even the US, which has been officially pushing for an IMF reform  
since 2010, seems to be experiencing obstacles on the path to opening further the Washington-based 
institution to emerging countries5.
5 In January 2014, the U.S. Congress failed to ratify an IMF capital increase, which, as part of a 4-year old reform package,  
would have paved the way for a shift of six percentage points of total quota to developing countries, and move two of the 24  
IMF directors from European to developing countries. Given its budgetary repercussions, this reform seems unlikely to be  
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Two other issues follow on from this.
First,  if  there were a more representative G7, it  would immediately follow that the G20, close to its  
current membership group, could survive although perhaps perform a less demanding role than it is  
currently trying to do. After its initial success, many argue that the G20 – which includes more than 20  
countries already – is too cumbersome to be truly effective, albeit more representative. So why not find 
a smaller, equally representative G7, which could be more effective, but keep the representative but  
cumbersome G20? This would allow all current (and future) G20 members to maintain their presence, 
which would mean individual euro-area members such as Italy would still have some presence on the  
international  scene.  Or  put  another  very  simple  way,  the  G7  should  be  a  group  of  the  largest  7  
economies, and the G20 a group of the largest or systematically most important 20 economies.
Second, if this principle can be recognised, the more thorny issue is what is necessary to encourage or  
entice individual euro-area members to volunteer such an advancement. Do they need to get a reward  
in order to give up their G7 and IMF prestige 6? While the answer is probably yes, it is also probably the 
case that the key countries should spend more time thinking about what might happen if they do not  
volunteer such moves.  To be more specific,  it  would probably mean that the institutions that  they  
dominate become less and less important to those countries that are excluded. And at the extreme, as 
we will turn to discuss, it could contribute to a collapse of the current international monetary system.
3.3 The world monetary system, the role of the renminbi and Europe.
So what does the world of our projected 2020 trade patterns and relative GDP size imply for the global  
monetary system? And following on from our  previous discussion,  is  there some incentive for  the  
Europeans to volunteer a smaller albeit more collective and perhaps more powerful representation in  
global economic governance?
A number of commentators have discussed the possible rise of the use of the RMB in line with the  
future  growth  of  China  (Wheatley,  2011;  Prasad  and  Ye,  2012;  Vallée,  2012)  but  there  is,  not  
surprisingly, no consensus on whether the RMB will ultimately be a truly floating currency like the US 
dollar or euro, and whether it will play a bigger role within the global monetary system, for example, as  
passed by 2015. 
6 A future paper will explore any rewards that might be necessary to give up these positions of prestige and importance.
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part of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the IMF. Most have assumed that the RMB will at some point  
play some sort of bigger role in the current global monetary system. Very few have considered the  
possibility that, if the RMB becomes more and more important, that in fact, China only agrees to greater  
usage of the RMB for trade purposes and instead of an eventual free usage of the currency for capital  
account purposes, actually attempts to persuade others to restrict the degree of free movement of 
capital. In more recent times, partly due the euro crisis, but also past crises in a number of emerging  
economies and fears of future destabilisation, some are starting to articulate the case for wider capital 
controls. Indeed, the IMF itself has suggested that there are perhaps some circumstances in which this  
is warranted7.
What is clear from the pattern of 2001-10 trade and our projections up to 2020, if the global monetary 
system is at all supposed to be reflective of global trade, then the role of the RMB needs to increase. As  
Prasad and Ye (2012) have argued, what the IMF chooses to decide when the mandated review of the  
components of the SDR are necessary by the end of 2015 will be highly illustrative. If it were solely  
based on their  share of world trade, it  would be clear that the RMB would become part of the SDR  
(possibly a significant share, with a higher weight than any other component than the US dollar  or  
euro).  Where it  is  much less clear  is  because of  one of  the other  stated key criteria and that  is  a 
currency’s usage as a potential reserve currency, which often relates to the ease by which investors 
can use the currency.
In the past year, China has made a number of decisions to allow more use of the RMB, both in terms of  
investing in and out of China, as well as supporting the growth of a number of so-called offshore trading  
centres  for  the  RMB,  including  London,  New  York,  Paris  and  Hong  Kong  and  Singapore.  A  further  
potentially important development was the late 2013 announcement of a free-trade zone in Shanghai  
in which the use of the RMB for investment purposes would be much more relaxed than elsewhere in 
the country. Some observers see this is as a pilot for more significant opening up of the use of the RMB.  
It is also the case that since this announcement, the central bank, the People's Bank of China,  has 
announced its intention to give the markets an even bigger role in setting the price of the RMB.
It does not take too big a leap of faith for this gradual opening up of the RMB to continue and to be part  
of a prelude to the RMB becoming part of the SDR basket as soon as 2015. What would seem an easier  
7 For  a  detailed  description  of  the  Fund’s  Institutional  view  on  capital  flows,  please  refer  to  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2012/POL120312A.htm.
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prediction to make, is that if not 2015, by the next formal due date, 2020, the inclusion of the RMB as  
part of the SDR would be inevitable.
If the RMB were to be included in the 2015 SDR basket revision, this might lead to a fresh debate about 
whether the SDR itself might play a much stronger role in the global monetary system, rather than just  
be an accounting currency for  the  IMF  and its  settlements.  Various  Chinese  academics  and  some  
policymakers  including  the  central  bank  Governor  (Xiaochuan,  2009)  have  recommended  such  a 
future  path.  Along  the  same  lines,  Nobel  laureate  Robert  Mundell  explained  how  the  SDR,  if  
complemented with the Chinese yuan and Russian rouble, could replace the US dollar as the new major  
world currency8. Buchanan and O’Neill (2010) have pointed out the difficulties with such a system, but 
no doubt more research would follow and is worthwhile.
One central aspect of the likely required monetary diplomacy as we approach 2015 is presumably  
linked to the question we asked earlier in terms of rewards and incentives for the European countries,  
especially  those participating in the euro.  If  it  can be assumed that the major developed countries 
would like the RMB to be increasingly determined by the markets and not 'controlled' and that the  
currency will be more easily usable, it would presumably not be a huge step to consider that a grand  
deal could be reached in which the 'price' for China to undertake the further steps required by the IMF  
would be for the developed world to agree to whatever steps are necessary to simultaneously allow  
China (and  other  emerging  countries)  more voting power  and  seats  within  the IMF,  and  in  turn,  a  
revamped and more effective G7.
Whether China would agree to such a bargain is still open to debate, but it would seem to be quite an 
obvious basis for a deal. Before discussing this a bit further, it is interesting that a number of central  
banks around the world  have announced in  recent  years that  they now hold  RMB  as part  of  their  
portfolios of reserve investments, including such diverse countries as South Korea9 and Nigeria10. It is 
also important to point out that if the RMB becomes part of the SDR basket, it would also open the door  
to  some  other  currencies participating.  Indeed  as  shown  by  Buchanan  and  O’Neill  (2010),  Russia  
technically  satisfies  all  the stated criteria  for  inclusion,  and the Russian  authorities have stated a  
stronger desire to join the SDR than China, at least in public.
8 http://www.forbes.com/sites/eamonnfingleton/2012/05/25/nobel-laureate-sees-beyond-the-euro-crisis-to-a-post-dollar-
world/.
9 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ee99aa2e-7669-11e0-b05b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2raSG0OQ8  . 
10 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203986604577257190163679120  . 
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As suggested, it is difficult to know whether China wants the RMB to become part of the SDR basket in  
2015 and would be prepared to accept the greater global responsibility of a bigger role in the IMF, a  
revamped G7 especially if the price were less control over the performance and use of the RMB. Would 
the  Chinese  central  party  leadership  want  a  group  of  US  and  European  investors  having  a  major  
influence on what happens to their currency?  We ask this question partly because since the eruption  
of the 2008-09 global credit crisis and the euro-area crisis in particular, a number of academics and 
policymakers  have  started  to  question  the  benefits  of  complete  freedom  of  capital  flows  (see  for 
example  Ostry, Ghosh,  and  Korinek,  2012;  Forbes,  Fratzscher,  Kostka,  and  Straub,  2012;  Korinek, 
2011). Indeed, eleven euro-area countries11 are trying to introduce, through the enhanced-cooperation 
procedure, a financial transactions tax to reduce the role of speculative capital flows. On one level, this 
might  be  something  that  Chinese  and  other  so-called  emerging  market-policymakers  have  some 
sympathy with. It is of course, something that will be opposed by the UK and US, the latter being of  
greater importance. However, an indirect consequence of broad advocacy of some form of restricting or  
discouraging the current degree of capital flows is presumably that European policymakers and/or the  
IMF cannot be so rigid in determining the exact requirements of RMB inclusion in the SDR basket. Nor in  
our view should they. Based on our research about how the rest of this decade will likely unfold, it is  
high  time  the  IMF  welcomes  the  recognition  of  China’s  rise  by  including  the  RMB  at  its  earliest  
convenience.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how the economic and political relevance of the West is in the process of  
being rescaled, but few realise quite to what degree this is happening, at what speed, and what the far-
reaching implications are. The scale of the change in the pattern of global GDP observed in the last ten 
years is unprecedented in modern history, indeed since such available economic data has existed. In  
the first 10 years of the 2000s, the pattern of wealth creation started to change dramatically: Japan lost 
ground at the same speed at which it had gained it in the previous decades, China increased its share  
of  world  GDP  by  an  unprecedented  5.25  percentage  points,  and  the  West's  share  of  world  GDP  
contracted by 10.33 percentage points: more than the combined loss of the previous four decades 
together.
11 Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Portugal, Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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The change in the pattern of economic growth at a global level has thus been accompanied by an 
unprecedented shift  in  trade patterns.  Similar  to  world  GDP shares,  the change in  pace in  the last  
decade is remarkable and unprecedented in recent history.
Most of the change witnessed over the last decade is largely due to China.  With an average yearly  
growth rate in trade of 23.2 percent over the period 2002-11, China has surpassed the United Kingdom, 
Japan and Germany in terms of global trade shares. Over the last decade, China increased its world 
trade share by 5.40 percentage points, while the OECD countries together lost almost 12 percentage 
points: such a large decline of developed countries is unprecedented.
All in all, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the next decade will largely see a continuation  
of the global macroeconomic trends observed in the early 2000s,  with perhaps some debate as to 
whether the rate of change will speed up. Based on past trends, we have extrapolated trade patterns up 
to 2020. Of course, by definition, such projections are merely a strong working assumption and subject  
to considerable uncertainty. However, as we have shown, such a simple exercise leads to powerful  
insights regarding the likely evolution of the balance of power in global governance, the changing role  
of different currencies in the foreign exchange market, and challenges for stability within the euro area.
By 2020 the world will look substantially different. While currently the EU is the largest trading block in  
the world, controlling a third of world trade, by 2020 this will shrink to one quarter, with China on the  
EU's heels. The BRICs, collectively, will represent 34 percent of global trade, significantly more than the  
EU. China itself, excluding the other BRICs, will have a considerably larger share of world trade than the  
US.
The world trade shares of the top five euro-area economies, although with significantly different initial  
trading positions, are all predicted to fall. The speed of the fall will vary according to the country and will  
depend on the economy’s trading performance in the last 10 years, as compared to the evolution of  
global trade. However, that is only part of the story. European countries tend to have quite different  
portfolios of trading partners, and this heterogeneity is quite likely to become more pronounced with  
time. When EMU was created, it was highly unlikely that 21 years later, anyone would have envisaged a 
world in which China, not France, would be Germany’s number one trade partner.
This finding suggests that there is an important challenge for the effective functioning of the euro area.  
In principle,  the single  most important rationale for  a currency union is  that participating members  
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conduct most of their trade with each other. This obviously underlined the economic rationale for EMU,  
in particular because of the close trade links between the largest economies: France, Germany and 
Italy. But if it is the case, that for each of these, more and more of their trade will be with countries  
outside the euro area, the benefits of EMU are less clear cut and will decrease over time.
Moreover, in terms of OCA criteria, we highlight the fact that increasingly heterogeneous trade partners,  
combined  with  the  mounting  weight  of  exports  in  countries’  GDP,  augment  the  possibility  of  a 
heterogeneous macroeconomic shock hitting the euro area.  Under  this  scenario,  optimal  monetary  
policy might differ as individual countries of the bloc find themselves at different points of the business  
cycle. The benefits of sharing a common currency would then be reduced.
All in all, what it certainly means is that if European policymakers genuinely wish for EMU to survive 
and indeed, become stronger, they have to ensure that it  is more robust and adaptable to ongoing  
challenges,  including  the  likelihood  that  trade  with  each  other  is  going  to  be  less  important  than  
conceived when EMU was created.
Moving to the implications for global governance, we have explained how, if the euro-area countries  
wish to maintain (indeed strengthen) the euro, then perhaps it might make sense for them to finally  
allow their  global representation to be united.  This notion has been aired before,  but based on our  
global trade share projections, and the patterns of growth facing individual countries, it is going to be  
increasingly difficult for the euro-area member countries to maintain their current status.
At the same time, it would be presumably much more effective to have a 'new' G7 in which the euro-
area members are represented as one. This would immediately make space for two other members in 
an exact G7, of which China would be clearly the most obvious choice.  An ideal  G7 as such would  
probably only really include the US, Japan and the euro area or alternatively the EU, from the so-called  
developed world,  leaving plenty of space for  other rising economies in addition to China.  If  such a  
revamped and more effective G7 could be established, it would pave the way for much easier reform of 
the IMF and World Bank and their voting rights and other issues.
If there were a more representative G7, it would immediately follow that the G20, close to its current  
membership group, could survive, although it would perhaps perform a less demanding role than it is  
currently. After its initial  success, the G20 – which includes more than 20 countries already – has  
come to be seen as too cumbersome to be truly effective, though it is more representative. As such, a 
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smaller, equally representative G7 could be more effective than the representative but cumbersome 
G20.
The  inability  or  lack  of  desire  of  European  countries  to  give  up  their  voting  power  and  seats  is  
acknowledged. However, key countries should spend more time thinking about what might happen if  
they do not volunteer such moves. To be more specific, it would probably mean that the institutions  
that they dominate become less and less important to those countries that are excluded.
It is clear from the pattern of 2001-10 trade and our projections up to 2020 that if the global monetary  
system is at  all  supposed to reflect  of  global  trade, the role  of  the RMB needs to increase.  In this 
respect, what the IMF chooses to decide when the mandated review of the components of the SDR is 
necessary by the end of 2015 will be highly illustrative. If the RMB becomes part of the SDR basket, it  
would also open the door to the participation of some other currencies, and this might lead to a fresh  
debate about whether the SDR itself might play a much stronger role in the global monetary system, 
rather than just be an accounting currency for the IMF and its settlements. 
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5. Appendix
5.1 Alternative extrapolation techniques
As discussed in Section 2.2,  in our baseline scenario we extrapolate trade patterns up to 2020 by  
assuming the trends observed in the past 10 years (2003-2012) will broadly continue. To do so, we 
compute the average yearly growth of trade (in USD) over the period 2003-2012 and then assume  
constant growth at this decennial average rate until 2020.
As Table 6 below shows, projected trade shares in 2020 do not heavily rely on the past window used for  
the extrapolation. In the case of the BRICs, for example, the projected share of world trade commanded 
by 2020 oscillates between 30.5% and 32.6%, using 17-year and 12-year averages, respectively.
Table 6: Share of world trade under alternative assumptions
2011
past window used for projections 10* 12 15 17 20
BRICs 15.6 31.1 32.6 30.9 30.5 30.7
China 9.7 22.2 23.4 22.6 22.6 23.5
European Union 34.3 22.8 25.2 26.0 26.0 26.5
France 3.6 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4
Germany 7.7 5.6 6.1 6.2 6.0 6.0
OECD members 60.6 50.5 51.6 53.6 54.1 55.3
United Kingdom 3.7 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.7
United States 10.7 7.6 7.6 8.8 9.4 9.7
2020f
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations. * baseline scenario.
We have also considered the possibility that past trends could slow down as we approach the end of  
this  decade,  as  hinted  at  in  Section  2.2.  We  have  thus  used  the  same  extrapolation  technique,  
assuming however half-trend growth over the period 2013-2020. The results for selected countries and 
country groupings are detailed below.
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Table 7: Share of world trade under alternative assumptions
2010
baseline half-trend baseline half-trend
BRICs 14.6 20.4 18.1 31.1 22.6
China 9.1 14.0 11.8 22.2 15.2
European Union 34.9 26.6 29.4 22.8 27.2
France 3.6 2.6 2.9 2.1 2.6
Germany 7.7 6.2 6.8 5.6 6.4
Italy 3.0 2.1 2.4 1.7 2.1
Netherlands 3.1 2.4 2.6 2.1 2.4
Spain 2.1 1.6 1.7 1.3 1.6
United Kingdom 3.8 2.7 3.1 2.1 2.7
United States 11.2 9.2 9.9 7.6 8.9
2015f 2020f
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations.
Alternative extrapolation techniques were also explored. In particular, we consider a fitted exponential 
model to project trade trends up to 2020. The results for selected countries and country groupings are  
detailed below.
Table 8: Share of world trade under alternative assumptions
2010
baseline exp baseline exp
BRICs 14.6 20.4 20.5 31.1 30.1
China 9.1 14.0 13.5 22.2 20.5
European Union 34.9 26.6 28.2 22.8 23.2
France 3.6 2.6 2.7 2.1 2.1
Germany 7.7 6.2 6.6 5.6 5.7
Italy 3.0 2.1 2.2 1.7 1.7
Netherlands 3.1 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.2
Spain 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3
United Kingdom 3.8 2.7 2.7 2.1 2.0
United States 11.2 9.2 9.2 7.6 7.7
2020f2015f
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations. Note: 10-year past windows used for both projection techniques.
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In line with the analysis carried out for the baseline scenario, we also illustrate how world trade shares  
projected using an exponential model vary depending on the past-window used for the projection. 
Table 9: Share of world trade under alternative assumptions
2011
past window used for exp projections 10 12 15 17 20
BRICs 15.6 30.1 34.2 35.4 33.8 31.5
China 9.7 20.5 22.9 24.2 23.7 23.4
European Union 34.3 23.2 29.0 32.3 33.9 34.7
France 3.6 2.1 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.1
Germany 7.7 5.7 7.0 7.6 7.8 7.6
OECD members 60.6 51.0 52.4 54.7 56.6 59.1
United Kingdom 3.7 2.0 2.5 2.9 3.2 3.5
United States 10.7 7.7 7.4 8.3 9.3 10.3
2020f
Source: Would Bank, Bruegel calculations.
Finally,  we fitted our data with an OLS model, which was then used to project trends up to 2020.  The 
results for selected countries and country groupings are detailed below. Given the fundamentals of  
change analysed in Section 2.1, we attach a very low probability to this scenario, which effectively  
implies little or no change in the status quo over the period 2010-2020.
Table 10: Share of world trade under alternative assumptions
2010
baseline OLS baseline OLS
BRICs 14.6 20.4 16.0 31.1 17.2
China 9.1 14.0 9.8 22.2 10.6
European Union 34.9 26.6 32.7 22.8 31.3
France 3.6 2.6 3.3 2.1 3.0
Germany 7.7 6.2 7.5 5.6 7.3
Italy 3.0 2.1 2.7 1.7 2.5
Netherlands 3.1 2.4 2.9 2.1 2.8
Spain 2.1 1.6 1.9 1.3 1.8
United Kingdom 3.8 2.7 3.3 2.1 3.0
United States 11.2 9.2 10.3 7.6 9.8
2020f2015f
Source: World Bank, Bruegel calculations. Note: 10-year past windows used for both projection techniques.
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